Wednesday, July 18, 2012

Religion in the Philippines

Religion in the Philippines

Jack MillerFocus on Asian Studies,1982.

The Philippines proudly boasts to be the only Christian nation in Asia. More than 86 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, 6 percent belong to various nationalized Christian cults, and another 2 percent belong to well over 100 Protestant denominations. In addition to the Christian majority, there is a vigorous 4 percent Muslim minority, concentrated on the southern islands of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. Scattered in isolated mountainous regions, the remaining 2 percent follow non-Western, indigenous beliefs and practices. The Chinese minority, although statistically insignificant, has been culturally influential in coloring Filipino Catholicism with many of the beliefs and practices of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism.
The pre-Hispanic belief system of Filipinos consisted of a pantheon of gods, spirits, creatures, and men that guarded the streams, fields, trees, mountains, forests, and houses. Bathala, who created earth and man, was superior to these other gods and spirits. Regular sacrifices and prayers were offered to placate these deities and spirits--some of which were benevolent, some malevolent. Wood and metal images represented ancestral spirits, and no distinction was made between the spirits and their physical symbol. Reward or punishment after death was dependent upon behavior in this life.
Anyone who had reputed power over the supernatural and natural was automatically elevated to a position of prominence. Every village had its share of shamans and priests who competitively plied their talents and carried on ritual curing. Many gained renown for their ability to develop anting-anting, a charm guaranteed to make a person invincible in the face of human enemies. Other sorcerers concocted love potions or produced amulets that made their owners invisible.
Upon this indigenous religious base two foreign religions were introduced -- Islam and Christianity -- and a process of cultural adaptation and synthesis began that is still evolving. Spain introduced Christianity to the Philippines in 1565 with the arrival of Miguel Lopez de Legaspi. Earlier, beginning in 1350, Islam had been spreading northward from Indonesia into the Philippine archipelago. By the time the Spanish arrived in the 16th century, Islam was firmly established on Mindanao and Sulu and had outposts on Cebu and Luzon. At the time of the Spanish arrival, the Muslim areas had the highest and most politically integrated culture on the islands and, given more time, would probably have unified the entire archipelago. Carrying on their historical tradition of expelling the Jews and Moros [Moors] from Spain (a commitment to eliminating any non-Christians), Legaspi quickly dispersed the Muslims from Luzon and the Visayan islands and began the process of Christianization. Dominance over the Muslims on Mindanao and Sulu, however, was never achieved during three centuries of Spanish rule. During American rule in the first half of this century the Muslims were never totally pacified during the so-called "Moro Wars." Since independence, particularly in the last decade, there has been resistance by large segments of the Muslim population to national integration. Many feel, with just cause, that integration amounts to cultural and psychological genocide. For over ten years the Moro National Liberation Front has been waging a war of secession against the Marcos government.
While Islam was contained in the southern islands, Spain conquered and converted the remainder of the islands to Hispanic Christianity. The Spanish seldom had to resort to military force to win over converts, instead the impressive display of pomp and circumstance, clerical garb, images, prayers, and liturgy attracted the rural populace. To protect the population from Muslim slave raiders, the people were resettled from isolated dispersed hamlets and brought "debajo de las companas" (under the bells), into Spanish organized pueblos. This set a pattern that is evident in modern Philippine Christian towns. These pueblos had both civil and ecclesiastical authority; the dominant power during the Spanish period was in the hands of the parish priest. The church, situated on a central plaza, became the locus of town life. Masses, confessions, baptisms, funerals, marriages punctuated the tedium of everyday routines. The church calendar set the pace and rhythm of daily life according to fiesta and liturgical seasons. Market places and cockfight pits sprang up near church walls. Gossip and goods were exchanged and villagers found "both restraint and release under the bells." The results of 400 years of Catholicism were mixed -- ranging from a deep theological understanding by the educated elite to a more superficial understanding by the rural and urban masses. The latter is commonly referred to as Filipino folk Christianity, combining a surface veneer of Christian monotheism and dogma with indigenous animism. It may manifest itself in farmers seeking religious blessings on their rice seed before planting or in the placement of a bamboo cross at the comer of a rice field to prevent damage by insects. It may also take the form of a folk healer using Roman Catholic symbols and liturgy mixed with pre-Hispanic rituals.
When the United States took over the Philippines in the first half of the century, the justifications for colonizing were to Christianize and democratize. The feeling was that these goals could be achieved only through mass education (up until then education was reserved for a small elite). Most of the teachers who went to the Philippines were Protestants, many were even Protestant ministers. There was a strong prejudice among some of these teachers against Catholics. Since this Protestant group instituted and controlled the system of public education in the Philippines during the American colonial period, it exerted a strong influence. Subsequently the balance has shifted to reflect much stronger influence by the Catholic majority.
During the period of armed rebellion against Spain, a nationalized church was organized under Gregorio Aglipay, who was made "Spiritual head of the Nation Under Arms." Spanish bishops were deposed and arrested, and church property was turned over to the Aglipayans. In the early part of the 20th century the numbers of Aglipayans peaked at 25 to 33 percent of the population. Today they have declined to about 5 percent and are associated with the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States. Another dynamic nationalized Christian sect is the lglesia ni Kristo, begun around 1914 and founded by Felix Manolo Ysagun. Along with the Aglipayans and Iglesia ni Kristo, there have been a proliferation of Rizalist sects, claiming the martyred hero of Philippine nationalism, Jose B. Rizal as the second son of God and a reincarnation of Christ. Leaders of these sects themselves often claim to be reincarnations of Rizal, Mary, or leaders of the revolution; claim that the apocalypse is at hand for non-believers; and claim that one can find salvation and heaven by joining the group. These groups range from the Colorums of the 1920s and 1930s to the sophisticated P.B.M.A. (Philippine Benevolent Missionary Association, headed by Ruben Ecleo). Most of those who follow these cults are the poor, dispossessed, and dislocated and feel alienated from the Catholic church.
The current challenge to the supremacy of the Catholic church comes from a variety of small sects -- from the fundamentalist Christian groups, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists, to the lglesia ni Kristo and Rizalists. The Roman Catholics suffer from a lack of personnel (the priest to people ratio is exceedingly low), putting them at a disadvantage in gaining and maintaining popular support. The Catholic church is seeking to meet this challenge by establishing an increasingly native clergy and by engaging in programs geared to social action and human rights among the rural and urban poor. In many cases this activity has led to friction between the church and the Marcos government, resulting in arrests of priests, nuns, and lay people on charges of subversion. In the "war for souls" this may be a necessary sacrifice. At present the largest growing religious sector falls within the province of these smaller, grass roots sects; but only time will tell where the percentages will finally rest.

For Further Reference
Agoncillo, Teodoro A. Short History of the Philippines. New York: Mentor Books, 1969.
Carroll, John J., and others. Philippine Institutions. Manila: Solidaridad, 1970.
Chaffee, Frederic H., and others. Area Handbook for the Philippines. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.
Corpuz, Onofre D. The Philippines. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; Spectrum Books, paper, 1965.
Gowing, Peter G., and Robert D. McArnis, eds. The Muslim Filipinos. Manila: Solidaridad, 1974.
Mercado, Leonardo N., ed. Filipino Religious Psychology. Tacloban City, Philippines: Divine Word University, 1977.
Ramos, Maximo D. Creatures of Philippine Lower Mythology. Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 1971.
Sturtevant, David R. Popular Uprisings in the-Philippines, 1840-1940. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976.

Article written by Jack Miller for the
Asia Society's Focus on Asian Studies, Vol. II, No. 1, Asian Religions, pp. 26-27,
Fall 1982. Copyright AskAsia, 1996.

Thursday, July 12, 2012

Spanish Execution

Spanish soldiers executing Filipinos on the Luneta, ca 1896-1897

Sunday, July 17, 2011

Pre-colonial History of Philippines

(Few years back I saved the following article in my computer. I forgot from where I got it! Before reading the following article I would like to say Thanks to the unknown writer of the following article. - Krishnakumar KA)

I Am posting this pre-colonial history of Maharlika for your comments. I got this from the internet. I want
some comments particularly from the Filipinos. The article seems to say the 10 Datus and the Code of
Kalantiaw is a myth? Here is the article.. quite long but interesting.

Pre Colonial Period
THE DIM CENTURIES prior to Magellan's arrival in 1521 were formerly unknown to historians. It is only in
recent years that history's frontiers have been explored by both historians and archaeologists. By means of intensive researchers in ancient Asian records and by new archaeological discoveries at various sites in the Philippine prehistory.
First Man in the Philippines. According to recent archaeological findings, man is ancient in the Philippines. He first came about 2500,000 B.C. during the Ice Age or Middle Pleistocene Period, by way of the land bridges which linked the archipelago with Asia. He was a cousin of the "Java Man," "Peking Man," and other earliest men in Asia. Professor H. Otley Beyer, eminent American authority on Philippine archaeology and anthropology, called him the "Dawn Man", for he appeared in the Philippines at the dawn of time.. Brawny and thickly-haired, the "Dawn Man", had no knowledge of agriculture. He lived by means of gathering wild edible plants, by fishing, and hunting. It is probable that he reached the Philippines while hunting. At that time the boars, deer, giant and pygmy elephants, rhinoceros, and other Pleistocene animals roamed in the country. Fossil relics of these ancient animals have been found in Pangasinan and Cagayan Valley. In the course of unrecorded time the "Dawn Man" vanished, without leaving a trace. Until the present time his skeletal remains or artifacts have not yet been discovered by archaeologists. So far the oldest human fossil found in the Philippines is the skull cap of a "Stone-Age Filipino", about 22,000 years old. This human skull cap was discovered by Dr. Robert B. Fox, American anthropologist of the National Museum, inside Tabon Cave Palawan, on May 28, 1962. This human relic was called the "Tabon Man". The Coming of the Negritos. Ages after the disappearance of the "Dawn Man", the Negritos from the Asian mainland peopled the Philippines. They came about 25,000 years ago walking dry-shod through Malay Peninsula. Borneo, and the land bridges. Centuries after their arrival, the huge glaciers of ice melted and the increased volume of water raised the level of the seas and submerged the land bridges. The Philippines was thus cut off from the Asian mainland. The Negritos lived permanently in the archipelago and became the first inhabitants.
The Negritos are among the smallest peoples on earth. They are below five feet in height, with black skin,
dark kinky hair round black eyes, and flat noses. Because of their black color and short stature, they
were called Negritos (little black people) by the Spanish colonizers. In the Philippines they are known
as Aeta, Ati, or Ita.
The Negritos were a primitive people with a culture belonging to the Old Stone Age (Paleolithic). They
wandered in the forests and lived by hunting, fishing, and gathering wild fruits and roots. Their homes were
temporary sheds made of jungle leaves and branches of trees. They wore little clothing. They had no
community in life, hence they developed no government, writing, literature, arts, and sciences. They
possessed the crudest kind of religion which was a belief in fetishes. They made fire by rubbing two dry
sticks together to give them warmth. They had no pottery and never cooked their food. However, they
were among they were among the world's best archers, being skilled in the use of the bow and arrow.
The Indonesians, First Sea-Immigrants. After the submergence of the land bridges, another Asian people
migrated to the Philippines. They were the maritime Indonesians, who belonged to the Mongoloid race with
Caucasian affinities. They came in boats, being the first immigrants to reach the Philippines by sea.
Unlike the Negritos, they were a tall people, with height ranging from 5 feet 6 inches to 6 feet 2 inches.

It is said that two waves of Indonesia migration reached the Philippines. The first wave came about
3000 B.C.; the second wave about 1000 B.C. The Indonesians who came in the first migratory wave were
tall in stature, slender in physique, and light in complexion. Those in the second migratory wave were
shorter in height, bulkier in body, and darker in color.
The Indonesian culture was more advanced than that of the Negritos it belonged to the New Stone Age
(Neolithic). The Indonesians lived in grass-covered homes with wooden frames, built above the ground or on
top of trees. They practised dry agriculture and raised upland rice, taro (gabi), and other food crops.
Their clothing was made from beaten bark and decorated with fine designs. They cooked their food in bamboo tubes, for they knew nothing of pottery. Their other occupations were hunting and fishing. Their implements consisted of polished stone axes, adzes, and chisels. For weapons, they had bows and arrows, spears, shields, and blowguns (sumpit). They had one domesticated animal - the dog. Exodus of the Malays to the Pacific World. The seafaring Malays also navigated the vast stretches of the uncharted Pacific, discovering and colonizing new islands, as far south as Africa and Madagascar. Their unchronicled and unsung maritime exploits impressed the British Orientalist A.R. Cowen, who wrote: "The Malays indeed were the Phoenicians of the East, and apparently made even longer hauls than the Semitic mariners, their oceanic elbowroom giving them more scope than the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea."
The prehistoric Malays were the first discoveries and colonizers of the Pacific world. Long before the time
of Columbus and Magellan, they were already expert navigators. Although they had no compass and other
nautical devices, they made long voyages, steering their sailboats by the position of the stars at night
and by the direction of the sea winds by day. Malayan Immigration to the Philippines. In the course of their exodus to the Pacific world, the ancient Malays reached the Philippines. They came in three main migratory waves. The first wave came from 200 B.C. to 100A.D. The Malays who came in this wave were the headhunting Malays, the ancestors of the Bontoks, Ilongots, Kalingas, and other headhunting tribes in
northern Luzon. The second wave arrived from 100 A.D. to 13th century. Those who came in this migratory wave were the alphabet-using Malays, the ancestors of the Visayans, Tagalogs, Ilocanos, Bicolanos, Kapampangans, and other Christian Filipinos. The third and last wave came from the 14th to 16th century A.D. The Muslim Malays were in this migratory wave and they introduced Islam into the Philippines.

The Malays. Daring and liberty-loving, the Malays belonged to the brown race. They were medium in height
and slender in physique, bur were hardy and supple. They had brown complexion, with straight black hair,
dark brown eyes, and flat noses. Culturally, the Malays were more advanced than the Negritos and the Indonesians, for they possessed the Iron Age culture. They introduced into the Philippines both lowland and highland methods of rice cultivation, including the system of irrigation; the domestication of animals (dogs, fowls, and carabaos); the manufacture of metal tools and weapons; pottery and weaving; and the Malayan heritage (government, law, religion, writing, arts, sciences, and customs). They tattooed their bodies and chewed betelnuts. They wore dresses of woven fabrics and ornamented themselves with jewels of gold, pearls, beads, glass, and colored stones. Their weapons consisted of bows and arrows, spears, bolos, daggers, krises (swords), sumpits (blowguns), shields and armors made of animal hide and hardwood, and lantakas (bronze cannons). Legends and Hoaxes about the Malay Settlers. The legends surrounding the settling of the Philippines by Malay migrants are notably celebrated in the ati-atihan festival and perpetrated by hoaxers in the fraudulent documents containing the Maragtas chronicle and the Code of Kalantiaw.
According to one legend, at around 1250 A.D., ten datus and their families left the kingdom of Borneo
and the cruel reign of sultan Makatunaw to seek their freedom and new homes across the seas. In Sinugbahan, Panay, they negotiated the sale of Panay's lowlands from the Negrito dwellers, led by their Ati king Marikudo and his wife Maniwantiwan. The purchase price consisted of one gold saduk (native hat) for Marikudo and a long gold necklace for Maniwantiwan. The sale was sealed by a pact of friendship between the Atis and the Bornean Malays and a merry party when the Atis performed their native songs and dances. After the party, Marikudo and the Atis went to the hills where their descendants still remain, and the Malay datus settled the lowlands. One of Aklan, Panay's fascinating festivals to this day is the ati-atihan, a
colorful mardi gras celebrating the legendary purchase of Panay's lowlands. It is held in Kalibo annually
during the feast day of Santo Niño in January. The riotous participants, with bodies painted in black and
wearing bizarre masks, sing and dance in the streets, re-enacting the ancient legend of the welcome held by
the Atis for the Malay colonizers.The Maragtas goes on to describe the formation of a confederation of barangays ("Madya-as") led by one Datu Sumakwel, who passed on a code of laws for the
community. The fictitious story also alleges the expansion of the Malay datus to other parts of the
Visayas and Luzon. Although previously accepted by some historians, including the present authors, it has
become obvious that the Maragtas is only the imaginary creation of Pedro A. Monteclaro, a Visayan public
official and poet, in Iloilo in 1907. He based it on folk customs and legends, largely transmitted by oral

The Code of Kalantiaw, a code of laws said to have been promulgated by Datu Kalantiaw of Aklan in 1433,
was also previously accepted by historians and lawyers. But it has been proven to be a fraud. The Code of Kalantiaw was contained in a set of documents sold by Jose E. Marco, a collector and author from Negros Occidental, to Dr. James E. Robertson, Director of the Philippine Library and Museum, in 1914. Robertson then published an English translation of the penal code, and Filipino scholars came to accept the code as a deliberate hoax.

Challenge to the Migration Theory. The migration theory offered by H. Otley Beyer to explain the early
settlement of the Philippines has been challenged by such scholars as Robert B. Fox and F. Landa Jocano.
According to these scholars, Philippines prehistory is far too complex to be explained by "waves" of
migration. It seems doubtful that early immigrants came in a fixed period of time and with a definite
destination. Nor can archaeological and ethnographic data, show that each "wave" of immigrants was really a
distinct racial and cultural group. According to the other viewpoint, the early Filipinos were not passive recipients of cultures but also active transmitters and synthethizers of them. For example, comparative studies of Pacific cultures show that some of the inhabitants of Micronesia, Polynesia and other Pacific islands came from the Philippines. Moreover, by the time the Spaniards came to the Philippines, the early Filipinos had developed a distinctly Filipino, as opposed to Malayan civilization.

Birth of the Filipino People. Whether one accepts the migration theory or not, it appears that out of the
interracial mixture of the early settlers - indigenous tribes or Asian latecomers - was born the Filipino people. Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, the Filipinos had already established a propensity for intermarriage with the assimilation of multiple races and cultures.

Early Relations with India. The early relations between the Philippines and the Indian empires of Sri-Vijaya and Majapahit were commercial and cultural, not political. As a free and independent people, the early Filipinos carried on trade with Borneo, Celebes, Java, Sumatra, and other countries of Southeast Asia.
And through Sri-Vijaya and Majapahit, they received India's cultural influences. The early contact between
India and the Philippines was decidedly indirect via Malaysia.

India's Cultural Influences. The impact of Indian civilization on the Philippines profoundly affected the culture of the Filipinos. The Brahmanistic elements in ancient Filipino religion and the names of their gods and mythological heroes were of Indian origin. The term Bathala (supreme god of the ancient Tagalog) originated from the Sanskrit Bhattara Guru, meaning "the highest of the gods". The sarong ( skirt ) and potong (turban) of the pre-Spanish Filipinos and the embroidered shawls of the present-day Muslim Filipino women reveal Indian influences. The ancient Filipino alphabet originated from India. About 25% of the words in the Tagalog
language are Sanskrit terms. Among such words are dala (fishnet), asawa (spouse), diwa (thought), puri
(honor), lakambini (princess), and wika (language). Filipino literature and folklore show the impress of
India. The Maranao epic Darangan is Indian in plot and characterization. The Agusan legend of a man named
Manubo Ango, who was turned into stone, resembles the story of Ahalya in the Hindu epic Ramayana. The tale of the Ifugao legendary hero, Balituk, who obtained water from the rock with his arrow, is similar to
Arjuna's adventure in Mahabharata, another Hindu epic.
Many Filipino customs are of Indian origin. Among them are the following: (1) placing a sampaguita flower
garland around the neck of a visitor upon his arrival and departure as a symbol of hospitality and friendship; (2) before marriage, a groom gives a dowry to the bride's parents and renders domestic services to his future in-laws; (3) when the guests throw rice on the bride and groom after the wedding; and (4) when a childless couple goes on a pilgrimage to a holy shrine, believing that the god of shrine will grant their prayer for fertility. Another Indian influence is seen in the decorative art and metal work of the early Filipinos, and in their use of brass, bronze, copper, and tin. The boat-lute, a musical instrument in southern Philippines, is of Indian origin. Finally, about 5% of the blood in Filipino veins in Indian. Because of their lineage, the Filipinos possess
dignity of bearing, indifference to pain, and a fatalistic outlook on life.

"Do all the good you can,
To all people you can,
In everyway you can."

Monday, June 6, 2011

Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality and Ethnocentrism (Part 4 of 4)

Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality and Ethnocentrism (Part 4 of 4)
by Nathan Gilbert Quimpo
Part Four: Conclusion

Originally Posted in KASAMA Vol. 18 No. 2 / April-May-June 2004 / Solidarity Philippines Australia Network

Ethnocratic Tendencies
Due precisely to the ethnocentricism of the Philippines´ dominant ethnie, the Philippine state has come to exhibit ethnocratic tendencies. An ethnocratic state, according to David Brown, is one which "acts as the agency of the dominant ethnic community in terms of its ideologies, its policies and its resource distribution." According to Brown, this involves three propositions:
  • Recruitment to the state elite positions, in the civil service, armed forces and government, is disproportionately and overwhelmingly from the majority ethnic group. Where recruitment of those from other ethnic origins does occur, it is conditional upon their assimilation into the dominant ethnic culture.
  • The cultural attributes and values of the dominant ethnic segment are employed as the core elements for the elaboration of the national ideology, so that the state´s depiction of the nation´s history, the state´s stance on language, religion and moral values, and the state´s choice of national symbols all derive primarily from the culture of the ethnic majority. Thus, the national identity which is employed to define the multi-ethnic society is neither ethnically neutral nor multi-ethnic, but rather it is mono-ethnic.
  • The state´s institutions - its constitution, its laws and its political structures - serve to maintain and reinforce the monopolization of power by the ethnic segment. Thus the channels which the state provides for participation are such as to either restrict all avenues for politics or to secure the disproportionate representation of the ethnic segment.
Brown clarified, however, that ethnocracy constitutes a tendency shown to varying degrees in a large number of states, and not a descriptive category to which any actual state completely conforms. [94]
The Philippine state is perhaps far from being as ethnocratic as that of Myanmar (Burma), [95] but there are still a lot of disturbing signs. To disprove that the Philippine state has ethnocratic tendencies, government representatives would probably point to the regional autonomy granted to the Muslim and Cordillera peoples, now enshrined in the country´s 1987 constitution. But it must be borne in mind that such "autonomy" was granted only after armed Muslim and Cordilleran movements had waged bitter wars against the government. And just how satisfactory this "autonomy" is remains questionable.
In the case of the Muslims, the MNLF has already signed three peace agreements with three different administrations (Marcos, Aquino and Ramos), each providing for Muslim autonomy. Less than three years after the latest - the 1996 peace pact - was signed, Eric Gutierrez lamented that a mangled version of autonomy was shaping up and that bureaucratic gridlock, legal disputes, political challenges and diminishing popular support were eroding the territory, authority, funding and political infrastructure of the new autonomous region even before it could be set up. [96] It would seem that Muslim autonomy is not really being implemented, just renegotiated. The 1996 pact also provided for "intensive peace and development efforts" to be carried out in the provinces covered by autonomy, but the Muslim areas remain as backward as ever. [97] And although all three government-MNLF accords promised Muslims greater representation and participation in the central government, there has hardly been any marked progress. For long periods, there were no Muslims in the Cabinet, in the Supreme Court and among the top generals of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. And for some time now, there has been no Muslim in the Senate, the upper house of the Philippine Congress. What can perhaps be considered as the only concrete achievements of the 1996 agreement are the end of the armed hostilities between the government and the MNLF [98] and the integration of a significant number of MNLF fighters and sympathizers into the Philippine armed forces and police.
Where the ethnocratic tendencies of the Philippine state lie strongest, however, is in the cultural sphere, or in what Smith has described as the "nation-building" process. Take the depiction of the Philippines´ "national history", for instance. Hardly anything has actually been done to redress the virtual exclusion of the Muslims from, and the distortions about them in, this "national history". Criticizing Philippine scholarship for being "obdurately silent" on the Moros, Aijaz Ahmad wrote in 1982: "From The Philippines: Past and Present, by Dean C. Worcester, the seminal work in American historiography of the Philippines, to History of the Philippines, by Renato Constantino, the most eminent of the contemporary Filipino nationalist historians, serious scholarship of the past seven decades nowhere offers even a dozen consecutive pages on the history, culture, politics and society of the Moros. They are left almost entirely to missionaries and obscurantists." [99]
In 1971, when armed clashes were starting to intensify in Mindanao, a group of Muslim leaders and scholars bewailed not just the perennial discrimination against Muslims in many levels of the national life but also "the misrepresentation or distortion of their true image as a historic people." [100] Since then, a number of historians have produced excellent scholarly works on the Muslims, but their contents have not been incorporated in textbooks on Philippine history being used in elementary and high school. Few Filipino school children have read or heard about such Muslim heroes as Sultan Qudarat, Alimudin I and Amai Pakpak. Since the Philippines gained independence, Filipinism, with all its omissions and distortions of the Muslims, has been the "official nationalism". [101]
In the 1960s and 1970s, Agoncillo, Constantino and other nationalist historians strove to correct the biases and blast the myths implanted by colonial (especially American) scholarship and to write "a truly Filipino history, the history of the Filipino people." [102] It now appears that the country´s "national history" needs to be revised or rewritten to rid it not just of strong survivals of colonial historiography, but also of ethnocentric biases, which in fact bear some extent of colonial influence.
On account of their religion and language, many Muslims have felt excluded from being full Filipino citizens. Although the Philippines, as a secular state, adheres to the principle of the separation of church and state, government functions and activities are still often marked by Christian customs and rituals. Christian Filipinos often proudly proclaim that the Philippines is the only Christian (or Catholic) country in Asia, and the government has done nothing to counter such insensitive ethnocentric thinking.
As Majul has rightly asserted, "the premise that the Catholic religion is one of, if not the basic element for identification in the Filipino national community ... [is] unacceptable on legal and historical grounds." [103] Filipino, the Tagalog-based national language, still has not been enriched much by the country´s non-Tagalog vernaculars and has hardly incorporated any words from the languages and dialects of the Muslim ethnic groups. The 1996 peace agreement does provide for the integration of Islamic values in the educational curriculum and the propagation of Arabic as an auxiliary medium of instruction, but these can only be truly implemented if and when the new autonomous region has been put in place.
By commemorating 12 June 1998 as the centennial of "the birth of the nation", the Philippine government transformed the Revolution of 1896-98 - in Gregory Bankoff´s words, "quintessentially a Christian affair" [104] - into a nationalist origin myth, a myth to which the Muslims cannot identify. Having been absent from "the birth of the nation", the Muslims, despite their valiant struggles against Spanish and American colonialism, have not been reflected in the country´s national flag and national anthem. The Philippine flag has a sun with eight rays, the rays symbolizing the first eight provinces that revolted against Spain in 1896. When the proposal to add a ninth ray to represent the Muslims was presented sometime ago, Christian Filipinos roundly rejected it. This, noted Macario Tiu, stands in contrast to what the United States did - as the number of states in the union grew from the original thirteen to the present fifty, the Americans just kept adding stars on their flag. [105]
Even as the Muslim struggle against colonialism is unreflected on the flag, the "gratitude" of Filipinos to the imperialist power which later tricked them and became their colonial master is flamboyantly displayed. No less than the Philippine Declaration of Independence explains the symbolism of the colors of the flag: "... the colors Blue, Red and White commemorating the flag of the United States of North America, as a manifestation of our profound gratitude towards this Great nation for its disinterested protection which it lent us and is continuing to lend us." [106]
The ethnocentric bias of Christian Filipinos and the ethnocratic tendencies of the Philippine state are perhaps best captured in the country´s foremost symbol: its name. Philippines and Filipino not only reflect what the Muslims have not wanted to be: Christian, Westernized, even colonial-minded. The terms are an insult to their creed and their very being. The MNLF could very well have been alluding in part to the appellations Philippines and Filipino when it contended: "[T]he Filipino government has the birthmarks of its Spanish and American predecessors. Its most distinct mark is its colonial character." [107] That Muslims have long objected to Philippines and Filipino and that Christians and the Philippine government have paid no heed to their objections are further indication of the Christian Filipinos´ ethnocentrism and the state´s ethnocratic tendencies.
It is no wonder that, as Kenneth E. Bauzon has pointed out, Muslims view the present government as a foreign government (gobirno a sarwang tao), a government of the Bangsa Pilipino (Filipino nation) of which the Bangsa Moro are not a part. [108] No wonder too that among many Muslims, the old MNLF slogan "Moros - not Filipinos!" still resounds and draws new adherents. Among Muslims who still say they are Filipinos, one can never be sure if the Filipino-ness is just on paper. The Sultan of Maguindanao and his associates, in fact, say they are Filipinos only by document - they have no choice but to put down Filipino as their nationality when filling out legal papers, e.g., in applying for jobs. [109]
Many of the Philippines´ nationalist writers and scholars have bewailed the persistence or resurgence of the colonial mentality, "colonial consciousness" or "neocolonial identity" among today´s Filipinos. [110] According to Constantino, colonial mentality, as commonly understood, "encompasses our subservient attitudes towards the colonial ruler as well as our predisposition towards aping Western ways". [111] Colonial mentality corresponds to what Fanon referred to as the internalization or "epidermalization" of inferiority among peoples subjected to colonization.
In Constantino´s view, the Philippines is a nation alienated from itself, with no real goals except to emulate alien standards and values imported from the North. Philippine society is an artificial one, as Filipinos pretend to be what they are not. In aping the worst consumerist aspects of the North, they have developed an obsessive desire to acquire consumer goods, especially foreign ones. Unlike their Asian neighbors, Filipinos have a weak sense of nationhood and feel little national pride. The young prefer to be citizens of one of the more powerful nations rather than Filipinos, and look forward to foreign placements for work. The sense of national community has been eroded; the crass materialism imbibed from the North has produced a massive rat race where everyone thinks only of self. With the globalization of culture, Filipinos get inundated through the transnational media with images full of artificiality, inanity, sexism, violence and racism. The culture being institutionalized is alien in language, direction and content. The educational system continues to miseducate Filipinos by glorifying the boons of continuing foreign domination at the expense of indigenous culture. [112] School children learn very little of their country´s history, especially of the heroic resistance of their ancestors to American occupation. "The legions of little brown Americans in our midst," bemoaned Constantino, "attest to such a tragic flaw." [113]
Poring over children´s textbooks and "letters to the editor" in Philippine dailies, Niels Mulder was struck by the great frequency and quantity of the Filipinos´ negative evaluations of themselves and of their country, with such references as "this God-forsaken country", "our society has really gone to the dogs", and "our culture of violence". Mulder related this penchant for self-flagellation and Philippines-bashing among contemporary educated Filipinos to "the colonialism-imposed syndrome that makes many Filipinos see themselves in the comparative perspective of the eternal underdog who feel they have to explain themselves, to apologize vis-à-vis outsiders". He traced how this self-flagellation came about. Thanks to the uncritical depicting in textbooks of the American era, Filipinos of the postcolonial period were effectively indoctrinated with the exemplariness of American civilization, and they started to measure themselves by its idealized standards. Perceiving themselves as culturally part of Western civilization, Filipinos proudly proclaimed themselves to be the world´s third largest English-speaking country, the only Christian nation in Asia, the showcase of democracy, the bridge between East and West. Convinced that their Westernized ways were superior and boasting one of the most robust economies in Asia, Filipinos felt a certain smugness towards their fellow Asians. Through the years, however, the Philippines´ growth lagged behind its neighbors. The myth of superiority completely unraveled during the Marcos dictatorship, a period of great unrest and crisis. As the country´s economy floundered, tens of thousands of Filipinos were forced or opted to work abroad. The ouster of Marcos through the "people power revolution" of 1986 resulted in the widespread visibility of I-am-a-proud-Filipino stickers. But such pride lasted for only a brief period, as political and economic conditions failed to improve significantly and the Philippines became "the sick man of Asia". The self-flagellation, which had started in the Marcos period, became common practice. [114]
Although "colonial mentality" is an overused term, noted Elmer A. Ordoñez, there are still many indications to this "affliction". He cited the pre-eminence in the mass media of American and Western pop culture in song, dance and lifestyles; the preference for "stateside" products to local goods; the continuing dominance of English over Filipino as medium of instruction; and the low visibility of Filipino authors compared to Western writers. [115]
A most telling sign of the Filipinos´ "epidermalization" of inferiority has to do with the epidermis itself. According to Randy S. David, one of the more enduring legacies of Spanish colonialism, which has been reinforced by American television, is a lingering colonial concept of beauty pervasive especially among the younger generation, one that is based on the "mestizo standard of beauty": fair skin, large eyes and tall noses. [116] Modern-day Filipinas, still as heavily made-up as Doña Victorina, have put one over her: they use skin whiteners or resort to face-lifts. Like their predecessors, today´s brown Spaniards and brown Americans look down on those who are dark-skinned.
Disagreeing with the "conventional wisdom" that Filipinos suffer from "colonial consciousness", "a weak sense of national identity" and a "damaged culture", Eva-Lotta E. Hedman and John T. Sidel contend that the Philippines has experienced "a cultural renaissance and a resurgence of nationalist consciousness and sentiment" in the past two decades. The nationalism is not "official nationalism", but a popular one, resulting in fact from the creative energies of Filipinos working outside - or even against - the Philippine state. According to Hedman and Sidel, the experience of anti-Marcos struggle in the 1980s, enjoyment of Philippine movies, television and pop music, and everyday struggles of overseas Filipino workers engendered new modes of representing Filipinos and imagining a Philippine nation. Instead of referring to and revering mythologized Origins and Great Man History, the new popular nationalism is characterized by "ironic, self-deprecatory humour", "mirthful irreverence" and "playful diasporic intimacy" and is more inclusively gendered. Hedman and Sidel cite highly varied examples of this popular nationalism, among them: a wacky comic strip providing its readers by metonymy an "imagined community" of fellow-Filipinos; newspaper columns of a historian (Ocampo) who brings Philippine historical figures to life with vignettes; two prizewinning novels written by a woman writer, both of which feature a female central character involved in a nationalist project; the proliferation of an article "testing" one´s Filipino-ness on the basis of a list of everyday Filipino practices; the growing patronage for "ethnic" jewelry and fabrics as well as for a folk music group using "ethnic" instruments; a rock group and a film making sly mockery of the mimicry of foreign songs and films; the emergence of strong solidarities among overseas Filipinos; and the outpouring of nationalist outrage over the execution of a Filipina maid in Singapore and the imprisonment of another in Abu Dhabi. [117]
Is there a persistence of colonial consciousness or is there a resurgence of nationalism?
Constantino, Mulder and Ordoñez, on the one hand, and Hedman and Sidel, on the other, apparently take positions that are polar opposites. Constantino and Hedman/Sidel even differ in the interpretation of a few particular phenomena. While Constantino castigates the giant shopping malls sprouting all over the country´s major urban centers as de-nationalizing influences promoting consumerist tendencies fed by foreign brand name advertising, Hedman/Sidel welcome them as reflecting and reproducing "an image of limited equality that resonates with the promise of democratic citizenship in the contemporary Philippines". And while Constantino tends to fault Filipino overseas contract workers for looking toward other countries to ensure their future, becoming almost exclusively economistic in their outlook and having little concern about what is happening to their country, Hedman/Sidel praise them for promoting what Anderson has described as "long-distance nationalism". [118]
But there are areas of reconcilability or at least complementarity. Mulder qualified that the middle classes are the ones indulging in Philippines-bashing and self-flagellation and that the population at large is not part of all this, except from being exposed to school and media negativism. Hedman/Sidel, on the other hand, see a resurgence of popular nationalism. Thus, it may very well be that while the middle classes remain ensconced in the colonial state of mind, the masses are already revelling in their mirthfully irreverent nationalism.
At one stage, Constantino expressed a disinclination to the term colonial mentality for it connoted "a resigned acceptance of it as the natural and inescapable condition of the average Filipino mind" and "disregard[ed] the necessity of looking inward to examine what forces within ourselves reinforce and deepen this intellectual bondage". He advised studying the dynamics of intellectual colonization in all its aspects to find out how the colonial attitude became a generalized condition, as well as to discover and develop the means of overcoming it. "The examination of our colonial consciousness and our eventual liberation from its control," he averred, "must be attended by the evolution and dissemination of a counter-consciousness." [119]
Outside of the few particular variances earlier mentioned as to what manifests a colonial attitude and what does not, the popular nationalism that Hedman/Sidel have discerned could very well fit into Constantino´s category of "counter-consciousness". Viewed through the "consciousness versus counter-consciousness" framework, the main difference between Constantino´s and Hedman/Sidel´s positions would be that while the former beheld colonial consciousness as still very much dominant in the Filipino psyche, the latter perceive the nationalist counter-consciousness as already having risen to predominance.
Hedman/Sidel present a refreshingly new - and for nationalists, hopeful - perspective on the development of nationalism in the Philippines. However, whether the nationalist counter-consciousness has indeed gained dominance over the colonial mind or still is an upcoming force that promises to be the wave of the future remains debatable. Whichever the case may be, there is no denying that the manifestations of the colonial mind are still very much around and that the process of cultural decolonization still needs to be vigorously pursued. Moreover, Hedman/Sidel have not presented any evidence that the "resurgent" popular ("Filipino") nationalism encompasses Muslim "Filipinos".
Several times over the past decade or so, many Filipinos, especially "Filipino nationalists", have raised a great hue and cry over the derogatory use by Westerners - or what were viewed to be such - of the word Filipino. Filipinos strongly protested when the words Filipino, Filipina and Filipineza were defined in several Western dictionaries as "a domestic helper" or "a maid". Filipinos were again in uproar when a packet of cookies produced in Spain and marketed in Europe carried the brand name Filipinos. Defining Filipino as a domestic helper is indeed an ugly, racist slur. On the other hand, the use of Filipinos as a name for cookies which are not made by Filipinos themselves may be as innocuous as Canton and Alaska in pancit Canton and Alaska milk, which are not products of the Cantonese and the Alaskans themselves. The common Filipino expression lutong Macao and the use of Double Dutch as the name for an ice cream being sold in Filipino supermarkets are perhaps much more politically incorrect.
But come to think of it, Filipino has for a long time - or even always - had either a pejorative or a discriminatory connotation to it. For over 300 years, the peninsular Spaniards used it to refer pejoratively to the insular Spaniards. When the mestizos and ilustrados adopted the name, they first made it an exclusive preserve for the insulares and for themselves, and excluded the lower-class indios. During the American colonial period, Filipino tended to be used only for "civilized" Christians and to discriminate against non-Christian "savages". From the very beginning, Philippines and Filipino have always had a colonial ring to them, but most Filipinos have chosen to just gloss over this. The Muslims in southern Philippines have always been conscious of, and protested against, the colonial-ness of Philippines and Filipino, but the dominant ethnie has ignored them and are dragging them into its colonial-mindedness.
(It seems apt to make a few asides here. First, since the Spaniards invented the term filipino and were the first filipinos, why shouldn´t they put it on their cookies? Second, what an irony that an appellation like filipino (or Filipino) that was once reserved for the elite in the Philippines during the Spanish period is now taken to mean a domestic helper! And third, again what an irony that the Filipinos in Europe today suffer from what the original moros - i.e., the Moors - experienced there centuries ago: In sixteenth-century Spain and Portugal, and in Naples and Venice, the Moors were stereotyped as servants. [120])
It is time to discard the name Philippines and together with it the appellation Filipino. They are utterly colonial names, manifesting the internalization and epidermalization of inferiority of the Filipinos. They are, in fact, doubly colonial in that they identify not just with the foreign monarch who ordered the country´s colonization, but also with the white criollos who were among the indios´ direct oppressors. According to George, prolonged usage of Philippines and Filipino have no doubt dulled the Filipinos´ awareness of their incongruity and colonial character. [121] But the colonial stigma remains. Far from diminishing or erasing the colonial stigma, prolonged usage of Philippines and Filipino has in fact heightened and accentuated it: the longer the usage, the deeper has been the internalization of inferiority - to the point that one takes these terms for granted and does not think about them anymore. The colonial names have to go all the more if Filipinos take to heart what Recto himself once declared: "[T]he independence of countries such as ours cannot be complete until the last traces of colonialism have been eradicated". [122]
Apart from being colonial, Philippines and Filipino have for long periods been associated with racial, class, ethnic/national and religious discrimination. As symbols of the ethnocentric prejudices of the country´s dominant ethnie and the ethnocratic tendencies of the Philippine state, Philippines and Filipino have not served as true emblems of the nation - or the constellation of nations or ethnic groups that are supposed to comprise the present Philippines - and of national identity. Rather, they have been a factor for continuing dissension and disunity. Christian Filipinos cannot afford to keep ignoring the objections of the Muslims to Philippines and Filipino, because, as Alastair Davidson has pointed out, nations simply cannot be made as they were in the past 200 years: it is no longer acceptable for a formally democratic country to forge national unity by mercilessly erasing cultural differences and making people "forget" their own, different pre-national histories. [123]
If given a good start, a new move to change the country´s name - on the basis of the arguments cited - could easily spark off a national debate, one that would draw people of all classes and ethnic origins into lively, heated and even impassioned discussion. Certainly a much livelier and more heated disputation than that over a packet of cookies. In the course of the discussion and debate, the country would be transformed into one big public forum or classroom on such questions as nationalism, colonial mentality, ethnicity and ethnocentrism.
The process of changing the name Philippines should help give further impetus to the much broader process of cultural decolonization and to the development of a more thoroughly anti-colonial and much more inclusive and popular nationalism. And it should help in rectifying historical injustices done to Muslims and other non-Christian communities, in rebuilding a truly multi-ethnic and multicultural national identity and in resolving the protracted armed conflict in Mindanao. In other words, the process would be a consciousness-raising and counter-consciousness-making exercise, vis-à-vis not just colonial but also ethnocentric thinking.
The new person that could emerge from the counter-consciousness-making would be one who has learned from, and come to terms with, his colonial past and not one who tries to gloss over it or gets bogged down ruing over it. In place of the subservience, the fawning and the self-bashing, there would be more of the assertiveness, the pride and perhaps the ironic, self-deprecatory humor. Apart from being decolonized, the new person would be more sensitive to other ethnic communities and groups, and more cognizant, tolerant and appreciative of ethnic and cultural diversity.
Since the roots of the Mindanao conflict are much more complex than terminological issues, changing the names Philippines and Filipino should only be a part of a much broader peace process involving meaningful political, economic, social and cultural changes. If not accompanied by these, name-changing would amount to nothing more than tokenism. Filipinism would change in name, but not in substance.
Even if Philippines has been the name of the islands for nearly half a millennium, replacing it may not be as difficult as it may first seem. For one, the Philippine Constitution does specifically provide a mechanism for changing the country´s name. Article XVI, Section 2 states:
The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national anthem, or a national seal, which shall be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national referendum. [124]
In finding a new name, there should be a lot of choices far better than names or terms that connote an ego-tripping dictator, a fictitious guerrilla unit or a big phallus. Jose B. Abletez has come up with the very worthy suggestions on how to pick a new name, based on his study of various countries´ names, to wit:
  • To honor heroes, real or mythical, e.g., Bolivia (in honor of South American liberator Simon Bolivar)
  • To convey love for freedom and independence, e.g., Thailand ("land of the free")
  • To denote cultural or racial origins or national pride, e.g., Iran.
  • To preserve the names of old nations or territories that have been merged, e.g., Tanzania (the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar)
  • In memory of old places like villages, e.g., Canada (derived from Kanatta, the name of an ancient Indian village)
  • To do away with old colonial stigma or insult to national pride, e.g., Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia, which was named after British colonizer Cecil Rhodes)
  • To indicate popularity of local forestry resources or mineral products, e.g., Ghana ("gold") and Brazil (a special hardwood product). [125]
In the light of the multi-ethnic character of the Philippines, the case of Burkina Faso, whose citizens are called Burkinabé, may be particularly instructive. Burkina Faso has many ethnolinguistic communities, the biggest of which are the Mossi, the Peul and the Bobo. Burkina comes from the Mossis´ word for "justice" or "uprightness". Faso is the Bobos´ term for "land". And the bé in Burkinabé comes from the Peuls´ word for "people". Burkina Faso thus translates as "land of the upright people". [126]
To foster greater unity among Christians, Muslims and non-Christian ethnic communities, Tiu has advocated for "reimagining" the Philippines as a national community, [127] while Arnold Azurin has proposed "reinventing the Filipino" (or more precisely, "reinventing the Filipino sense of being and becoming"). [128] Perhaps the first step in reimagining the Philippines is to change Philippines into an un-colonial and much more inclusively representative name. And perhaps the first step in reinventing the Filipino is to change Filipino.
Constantino once declared that "the only true Filipino is the decolonized Filipino." [129] But producing a decolonized Filipino is perhaps an impossible task. Even more than "Filipino nationalism", "decolonized Filipino" is a contradiction in terms.

[94] David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia, London & New York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 36-37.
[95] On Myanmar as an ethnocratic state, see David Brown, pp. 33-65.
[96] Eric Gutierrez, "The Politics of Transition", Accord, Issue 6/1999, p. 70.
[97] In this, of course, MNLF chairman Nur Misuari and other Muslim leaders also have a lot to answer for. See Jacques Bertrand, "Peace and Conflict in the Southern Philippines: Why the 1996 Peace Agreement is Fragile," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, (Spring 2000), pp. 37-54.
[98] This has to be qualified. Two Moro rebel groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf are still at war with the government.
[99] Aijaz Ahmad, "Who is the Moro?", Southeast Asia Chronicle, Berkeley: Southeast Asia Resource Center, Issue No. 82, February 1982, p. 2.
[100] Muslim Leaders in the Philippines, "Muslim Leaders´ Consensus of Unity", Manila Times, 21 July 1971.
[101] Anderson describes official nationalism as follows: "This is the form of nationalism which surfaces as an emanation and armature of the state. It manifests itself, not merely in official ceremonies of commemoration, but in a systematic program, directed primarily, if not exclusively, through the state´s school system, to create and disseminate an official national history, an official nationalist pantheon of heroes, and an official nationalist culture, through the ranks of its younger, incipient citizens - naturally, in the state´s own interests. These interests are first and foremost in instilling faith in, reverence for, and obedience to its very self." (Anderson 1998, p. 253.)
[102] Constantino, Renato The Philippines: A Past Revisited, Quezon City: Renato Constantino, 1975, pp. 3-5.
[103] Peter Gowing (ed.), Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines, Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988, p. 122.
[104] Gregory Bankoff, "History at the Service of the Nation-State", Public Policy, Vol. II, No. 4, October-December 1998, p. 29.
[105] Macario D. Tiu, "Diversity and the National Community" [Lecture delivered at the 25th National Conference of the Pambansang Samahan sa Sikolohiyang Pilipino (National Association of Philippine Psychology), Davao City, 24 November 2000)].
[106] Ocampo (1998), p. 2.
[107] Moro National Liberation Front Manifesto (mimeographed), addressed to the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, July 12-15, 1975, p. 8.
[108] Bauzon, p. 149.
[109] Wahab Ibrahim Guialal, "Perceptions of Democracy and Citizenship in Muslim Mindanao", in Maria Serena Diokno (ed.), Democracy & Citizenship in Filipino Political Culture, Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, 1997, p. 164.
[110] See, for instance, Constantino (1978); and Joan Orendain (ed.), The Invisible Enemy - Globalization & Maldevelopment, Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1997, p. 5, 107.
[111] Constantino (1978), p. 277.
[112] Orendain, pp. 4, 107-108, 134-135, 139; Constantino, "Sanitizing History", Manila Bulletin, 20 September 1995, p. 11; and "Collective Amnesia", 29 December 1996, p. 11; cited in Abueva (1998), pp. 220-221, 246-247. In his later writings, Constantino referred to the advanced capitalist countries as "the North" instead of as "the West".
[113] Constantino, Fetters on Tomorrow, Quezon City: Karrel, Inc., 1996, pp. 103, 111-112.
[114] Niels Mulder, "Filipino Images of the Nation", Philippine Studies, Vol. 45, First Quarter, 1997, pp. 50-74.
[115] Elmer A. Ordoñez, "The Alternative Hegemony in Culture", The Other View, Manila: Kalikasan Press, 1989, pp. 91-92; cited in Abueva (1999), p. 573.
[116] Randy S. David, Public Lives: Essays on Selfhood and Social Solidarity, Pasig: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1998, pp. 62-63.
[117] Eva-Lotta E. Hedman and John T. Sidel, Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-colonial Trajectories, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 140-165.
[118] Orendain, pp. 107-108, 134; Constantino, "Sanitizing History", Manila Bulletin, 20 September 1995, p. 11, cited in Abueva (1998), pp. 220-221; Hedman and Sidel, pp. 135, 160.
[119] Constantino (1978), pp. 277-278.
[120] Pieterse, pp. 124-125.
[121] George, p. 269.
[122] Constantino (1965), p. 6.
[123] Alastair Davidson, From Subject to Citizen: Australian Citizenship in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 18-19; cited in Kathleen Weekley, "Nation and Identity at the Centennial of Philippine Independence", Asian Studies Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 1999, pp. 343-4.
[124] The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (booklet), Philippines: National Book Store, 1987, p. 56.
[125] Jose P. Abletez, "Why Not a New Name for this Ex-Colony", Philippine Graphic, 17 June 1996, p. 40; cited in Abueva (1998), pp. 658-660.
[126] Wim Ettema and Gerrie Gielen, Burkina Faso, Amsterdam: Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen and Novib, 1992, p. 14.
[127] See Tiu, "Diversity and the National Community".
[128] See Arnold M. Azurin, Reinventing the Filipino Sense of Being and Becoming: Critical Analyses of the Orthodox Views in Anthropology, History, Folklore and Letters, Quezon City: CSSP Publications, 1993.
[129] Letizia R. Constantino and Lourdes B. Constantino (eds.), A Constantino Sampler, Quezon City: Karrel, 1989, p. 79; Orendain, p. 146.
Nathan Gilbert QuimpoABOUT THE AUTHOR:

taught at the University of the Philippines, Diliman and the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He is currently an Associate Professor in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Tsukuba in Japan.

He is the author of Contested Democracy and the Left in the Philippines after Marcos (Yale University Southeast Asia Studies and Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2008), and co–editor, with Patricio Abinales, of The US and the War on Terror in the Philippines (Anvil Press, 2008).

CPCA Brisbane have the following articles written by Nathan Quimpo in the CPCA library. Contact CPCA at the address below to send you copies for the cost of photocopying plus postage

  • What Muslim Mindanao Really Means to Arroyo
  • Contested Democracy and the Left in the Philippines
  • Trapo Parties and Corruption
  • Red leaders afraid Kintanar knew too much, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 28 January 2003.
  • The Left and Democratisation in the Philippines
  • Peace Movement and Credible Mediator Needed to Save Talks
  • Balikatan: Tripwire to a Bigger, Internationalized War?, Conjuncture, Vol. 14 No.1, Jan-Feb 2002
  • Internal Struggle in CPP: Sisons vs. Tiamzons, part 1 of 2, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 August 2001.
  • Different styles, same goals: The struggle continues, part 2 of 2, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 August 2001.
  • The Revolutionary Left: Back to centre stage?, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 June 2001.
  • Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in the Southern Philippines, Asian Survey, Vol. XLI, No. 2, March/April 2001.
  • Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace in Mindanao, paper delivered at the forum Kalinaw! The Quest for Lasting Peace in the Philippines, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands, 29 September 2000.
  • Colonial Name, Colonial Mentality and Ethnocentrism, Public Policy, Vol. IV No. 1, January-June 2000.
  • Dealing with the MILF and Abu Sayyaf: Who´s Afraid of an Islamic State?, Public Policy, Vol. III No. 4, October/December 1999.
  • Barrio Utrecht, Sunday Inquirer Magazine, 7 November 1993.
  • Toward a Revolutionary Strategy of the 90s, published under the pseudonym Omar Tupaz, Debate, Issue No. 1, Sept 1991, quarterly journal of the Kalinaw Foundation, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, August 10, 1991.
CPCA (Brisbane),
84 Park Road,